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Beskrivelse
The treatment of tradition as "revelation" flouts the pre-eminence of revelation in relation to tradition. The designation of tradition as revelation was an aberration in exegesis. It signalled a corruption of exegesis. It refocused attention upon tradition at the expense of revelation. For reports by persons attained a rank equal to the words of God. This was a relapse into polytheism. The designation of tradition as revelation resulted in the subordination of revelation to tradition. This was an additional aberration. The subordination of revelation to tradition was accelerated by the repression of reason. For had reason remained free, it could express its reservations and resisted this proposition. Reason was rejected on the grounds that recourse to reason in religion was disbelief. This tenet was based upon the perception that faith and reason are "mutually exclusive" or "incompatible." According to the perception that there is an irreconcilable antagonism between reason and revelation, a person may not be a thinker and a believer - at the same time. We are expected to follow reason or faith. But the alleged "incompatibility" of reason and revelation is a false dichotomy. For faith is rational. It is grounded in reason. We have faith in Allah not because we see Him, but because we perceive the signs of His existence. The alleged "conflict" between reason and revelation is at the root of the flaws of the "traditional approach." This "method" encompasses a range of practices and beliefs. The disenfranchisement of reason and the treatment of tradition as revelation produced a range of aberrations in exegesis and jurisprudence. It confused the umma and attributed traits to the methodology of Islam - exegesis and jurisprudence - that flouted tawhid. First, the traditional methodology is distinctly anti-intellectual. It treats reason as unsuitable for understanding revelation. Second, the traditional method subordinates reason to tradition. From this it follows that tradition is to be followed even against reason. These traits pave the way for a breakdown of reason and the advent of taqlid or the unquestioned adherence to tradition. The elevation of tradition to revelation was justified by reference to the verse where revelation says that: "He does not speak of his own desire. It is but a revelation revealed." From this verse traditional exegetes concluded that everything ever spoken by the prophet was revelation. Does this encompass all that he uttered in the forty years prior to the time he received revelation? No distinction is made between what Muhammad uttered as a prophet, and his role as a messenger. The assertion that all that the prophet uttered was revelation enabled the treatment of tradition as revelation. This resulted in a remarkable expansion of revelation. Unfortunately, it led to the corruption of the knowledge of revelation, too. For the prophetic traditions are not records of what the messenger uttered; they are records of what different transmitters reported, in their words. In different words, the books of the prophetic traditions are paraphrases of what the messenger allegedly uttered, not verbatim reports. Thus, on what grounds are they treated as "the words of the prophet"? The assumption that the prophetic traditions are flouts the teaching of tawhid. It suggests revelation and tradition are "equal." By extension, it suggests that Allah and Muhammad are likewise "equal." That Allah and the prophet are perceived as "equals" is reflected in references to Allah and the prophet we encounter in places of prayer. For they are treated there as if they were "equals." The tendency to treat Allah and the prophet as "equals" may also be perceived in references to the prophet as "holy," in references to the sunna as "divine," and in assertions that we "revere" the sunna.
