The Second Pillar of Islam: Rethinking the Replacement of Ethics by Rituals in Islam

In traditional Islam, ethics are being replaced by rituals. Why are there no books in Bukhari on justice, reason, freedom, or ethics? Even Shatibi refrained from treating justice as a purpose of Islamic law. The de-emphasis on ethics, in tandem with the enforcement of religiosity is reducing the relevance of Islam. Muslims turn to Islamism and related perspectives because they are unable to find justice in tradition, which is becoming less relevant as a result of disregarding key teachings of the Book of Allah. The failure to treat non-Muslims with justice is palpable in the teaching of jihad al-talab, an extremist rendition of religion without any foundation in revelation. The pushback for unjust efforts to propagate Islam by the sword, based on traditions according to which "the blood of the kafir is halal for the believer," resulted in defeats for the umma, bringing an end to every empire without exception. For building an empire upon a corrupt knowledge of revelation is to build on weak foundations. The repression of reason enabled the misunderstanding of revelation and the treatment of tradition as "revelation." The repression of reason stifled different perspectives, thereby restricting progress. Traditional exegesis and jurisprudence rest on premises. A premise is an assertion that provides a pillar of the analysis. Premises take the form of presuppositions. These presuppositions could be in accord with, indifferent to, or in defiance of a discourse a particular exegesis endeavours to articulate. As a matter of principle, all presuppositions in the exegesis of revelation should be derived from revelation, should be in agreement with it. If for any reason a particular presupposition veers from or defies revelation, the analysis based upon that presupposition becomes flawed and requires being rehabilitated or rejected. This transpired with several presuppositions of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence. They include the perceptions that revelation is flawed because it is "unclear," "incomplete," and "incoherent." These presupposition emerged as a result of the reticence to use reason in acquiring knowledge of revelation. They paved the way for recourse to a flawed exegesis, based on a misunderstanding and even defiance of the teaching of revelation, viz. that revelation is "clear," "complete," and "coherent." Hence the entire edifice of traditional exegesis and jurisprudence requires being re-constructed, this time on the basis of presuppositions that are in agreement with what they seeks to "explain," the teaching of revelation. Further tenets also veer from revelation. They encompass the perception that tradition is revelation, that reason is subordinate to tradition, the assumption that isnad matter more than matn in the verification of traditions, the teaching of predestination, the teaching of abrogation, the teaching of jihad al-talab, and the perception that the globe is a battlefield between the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb. The premises that tradition is revelation, that it judges, abrogates and is able to replace revelation are particularly problematic because they are expressions of scriptural and juristic shirk. Thus, the greatest weakness of traditional exegesis is its adulteration by procedural shirk. The greatest weakness of traditional jurisprudence is its adulteration by juristic shirk.

This adulteration renders traditional exegesis and jurisprudence problematic and ill-equipped to provide reliable scriptural and juristic analysis.Traditionists assert that there is no morality without religion. That is a far-fetched proposition, betraying an indifference to reason. For we recognise particular practices as evil from the evil they bring. But the articulation of ethics without reference to revelation requires recourse to causality, the awareness that acts produce effects, good or evil, according to the action taken.