The Coin Conundrum

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has once again become



the subject of contentious debate within the U.S.



Army. Its supporters insist that the new approach enshrined



in the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Field Manual



(FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, led coalition forces to



turn the tide of the campaign in Iraq. Critics argue that



the surge and the end of the Shia uprising, not COIN,



led to the dramatic decline in violence from 2006-2009.



The failure of the new approach in Afghanistan, they



claim, supports their argument that expeditionary



COIN does not work. How this debate gets resolved



could have significant implications for U.S. Army



force structure in a time of shrinking defense budgets.



The author, Dr. Thomas R. Mockaitis, considers



what role, if any, COIN should play in the Army of



the future. He examines the U.S. military's historical



experience with intrastate conflict as background for



understanding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He



then reviews the current debate over COIN...