Strategy and the Military

One facet of a future military science would lie in giving advice to the political leadership on the strategic orientation of the state in questions of long-term se curity and a second facet in the scientific underpinning of military operational command. Both task qualities would have to be thought of as an organic unity because the escalation chain for controlling vital threats in an emergency ranges from advice on the strategic purpose to operational implementation planning to tactical implementation, and frictions can only be avoided, at least to a large extent, if both strategic advice and operational implementation re main in one hand. Military science sees itself neither in competition nor in opposition to security policy research, but as its necessary dialectical complement. However, in order to be able to make a substantial contribution to such an overall national syn thesis, an institutionalised military science is required that qualitatively equals the standard at a university and thus enjoys the same academic recognition as the civilian disciplines. A future military science can only provide the indispensable and unsubsti tutable benefit for the security of society if it starts from an understanding of strategy that is based on long-term purpose and not on the short- to medium term implementation of already predetermined decisions. It develops its strate gic advisory contribution on the basis of a specifically military assessment logic derived from abstracted leadership principles, i.e. developed from military lead ership practice. The added value of this propaedeutic approach, lies in demonstrating that the military can provide the above benefit, given a certain understanding of strategy and a corresponding thematic and structural orientation of military science. This propaedeutic introduction is intended as an offer, aimed at students of mil itary science or civil security studies and at future strategic decision-makers or decision-preparers from the